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and provide a formal explanation of how the initial disadvantage turns out to be a 
prospect in disguise.  In particular, we show that a larger number of skilled workers from 
a mixed cohort of immigrants tend to take up riskier self-employment compared to 
skilled natives.  This explains a higher average income with high temporal income 
variability for the immigrant group, with consequent implications for income 
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1. Introduction 
Self-employment among immigrants in richer countries appears to be a dominant 
trait over some years now.  Particularly for the United States and Canada, as well as for a 
large number of West European countries there exists a vibrant source of empirical 
estimates which shows that the self-employment rate among immigrants of first and 
successive generations exceed that of native born (Bates, 1997; Clark and Drinkwater, 
2000; Li, 1997; Yuengert, 1995; Fairlie and Meyer, 1996; and also Razin, 1992, a case 
study on Israel with respect to Asian, African, East European and N. American 
immigrants; Kidd, 1993 for Australia etc).1 Albeit, availability of appropriate data 
precludes similar studies on developing countries, yet there is some belief that the 
occupational behavior of immigrants to such countries, where the group largely 
comprises of refugees and asylum seekers would not be significantly different from that 
observed in richer countries.  In fact, we show that the crucial conditions that may lead to 
such an outcome in the richer countries are rather universal and might also be tenable for 
the developing world.  However, given the voluminous literature we need to offer a brief 
overview of the existing evidence before we delve on the uniqueness of arguments 
generating such conditions.          
 The question of occupational choice was preceded by concerns about income 
assimilation of immigrants with that of natives (see Chiswick, 1978; Carliner, 1980 etc.).  
Yuengert (1991) however notes that most previous studies of immigrant assimilation 
either excluded self-employed workers or have included them without concern for the 
economic process generating sector choice and earnings.  Interestingly in a recent study 
                                                 
1 Fairlie (1996), for example, shows that the Korean American men and women have self-employment rates 
of 27.9 and 18.9 %, respectively, followed by Lebanese immigrants and so on.  Kidd (1993) shows that 
among skilled Australian immigrants (collegiate), self-employment rate exceeds that of natives.     
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Lofstrom (2002) shows that self-employed immigrants are found to do substantially 
better than wage-salary immigrants.  Earnings of self-employed immigrants are predicted 
to converge with natives’ wage at the age of 30 and to natives’ self-employment earnings 
at the age of 40.  Generally speaking, studies in this area mostly estimate the cross-
section earnings functions and have so far reached two main conclusions: (i) the age-
earnings profile of immigrants is steeper than that of native population with the same 
measured skills; (ii) the age-earnings profile of immigrants crosses that of natives about 
10-15 years after migration.  In particular, Chiswick’s (1978) analysis showed that at the 
time of arrival the immigrants earned about 17% less than the natives.  Because 
immigrants experience faster wage growth, their earnings overtake native earnings within 
15 years after arrival, so much so that, after 30 years in the US the typical immigrant 
earns 11% more than a comparable native worker.2      
  Among existing explanations of occupational choice of immigrants, the first type 
deals mainly with racial and ethnic backgrounds of immigrants (Bates, 1997; Borjas, 
1987; Duleep and Regets, 1997; Funkhouser and Trejo, 1995; LaLonde and Topel, 1992; 
Light, 1984; Yuengert, 1995).  The notion of cultural traits observed at the source of 
immigration is used as crucial information in understanding the choice of occupation and 
often the entrepreneurial behavior of immigrants seems to be molded in the country of 
origin or rooted in their cultural background.  Alternatively, Waldinger et al. (1990) note 
that, minority self-employment patterns can be better explained by considering 
constraints and opportunities facing immigrants in the host country, when racial 
characteristics like “thrift and cooperation” (Bonacich and Modell, 1981, p. 45-47) play a 
                                                 
2 Duleep and Regets (1999) provide yet another convincing picture on immigrant-native (and also between 
immigrants) income assimilation mainly driven by investment in human capital.     
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significant role.  This modifies earlier findings (for example, by Lucas, 1978) that 
entrepreneurial ability is an innate trait: some have personal abilities to be an 
entrepreneur independently of their socio economic and political history, while others do 
not.        
The second type of explanation, and more akin to our analysis here is based on the 
notion that immigrants’ choice of occupation is mainly governed by their attitude towards 
risk and uncertainty present in the labor and capital markets (for example, Boadway et 
al., 1998; Chau and Stark, 1999; Coate and Tennyson, 1992).  Other than these, social and 
economic discrimination in labor markets and in capital markets are also relevant factors 
in shaping immigrants’ choice of occupation (Borjas and Bronars, 1989; Coate and 
Tennyson, 1992; Moore, 1983).  Interestingly, the existence of such constraints may 
change immigrants’ occupational preferences substantially.  This group of studies 
therefore suggests that the existence of asymmetric information in factor markets and 
direct discrimination can both mold the final choice of occupation by immigrants, 
although the first of these arguments have not been explored directly.   
In contrast, the income assimilation debate seems inconclusive and far from over.   
According to Borjas (1985), the positive cross-section correlations between the relative 
wage of immigrants and years since migration “need not indicate that the wage of 
immigrants converges to that of natives” (p.  465) and that this assimilationist hypothesis 
draws inferences about earnings based on a “single snapshot” (Borjas, 1987, p. 532) of 
the entire immigrant population.  There is possibility of error in doing that, since 
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immigrant quality over time might have changed and could be responsible for 
convergence.3    
In this paper we argue that one core element in the entire mechanism that can 
significantly explain both has thus far not received the adequate attention it deserves.  We 
establish that the existence of asymmetric information in cross-border labor markets is 
such an element that strongly influences the choice of occupation among immigrants in 
favor of self- employment / entrepreneurship and subsequently acts as a strong catalyst in 
favor of catching-up economically.  The choice of a riskier occupation with more volatile 
but higher returns provides them with a head start towards faster income assimilation 
with the natives.  In other words, this paper seeks to understand the occupational 
distribution and income assimilation for the immigrants in the foreign labor market 
characterized by imperfect information regarding the quality of the immigrant workforce.  
A key assumption is that screening devices are non-existent for such markets or at best 
inefficient.  Our results should be equally tenable in any labor market where the employer 
has insufficient information about the productivity of a potential job seeker – a situation 
that is often compelling in many developing countries as well where the urban employer 
cannot instantaneously ascertain the skill of a worker arriving from a remote village.         
It is well known that informational asymmetry in the labor market is an 
application to a situation where (at least initially) employers do not know the productivity 
levels of individual employees.  It can arise if the markets are isolated such that 
“information does not ordinarily flow across them (or does not flow costlessly and 
                                                 
3 Also see Duleep and Regets (1997) supporting the entry of lower ability immigrants in the US, and with 
less transferable skills. Berger and Gabriel (1991) for USA show that earnings profile for immigrants 
before 1970 exceeds that of natives. Those who arrived after 1970 have a lower mean income. This 
supports Borjas (1985, 1987).   
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freely)” (Katz and Stark, 1987, p. 718).  Undoubtedly, informational asymmetries 
become much more obvious when labor mobility between different countries is 
considered, with the source country languages,4 systems, institutions and cultures 
differing widely from that of the destination country.  Moreover, over the last few 
decades, migration of labor from poor to rich countries have completely overshadowed 
the earlier white European migration to the ‘New World’, as also intra-Europe migration.  
The cultural and ethnic distances and consequently the informational gap on an 
immigrant’s true type have thus increased to such an extent, that available screening 
devices may not be adequate for assessing the true types of this heterogeneous pool.5  
Besides, immigration to developed countries is highly skewed in favor of the relatively 
unskilled (Kar and Guha-Khasnobis, 2006) and education as a signaling device is often 
incomprehensible especially when educational systems are largely different between 
countries of the North and the South.6  Recently, Kar and Saha (2009) characterize 
several menu contracts offered by rich country employers to influence self-selection 
among immigrants, when screening devices are inefficient.   
However, the informational asymmetry that we consider in our model does not go 
beyond the labor market.  Furthermore, inclusion of direct discrimination in both labor 
and capital markets (or inter market spillover effects of discrimination as in Coate and 
Tennyson, 1992) and imperfections in other factor markets should extend the basic model 
                                                 
4Among many studies along this line, Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) recently measure the importance of host 
country (UK) language in the income assimilation profile of an immigrant, such that, lack of fluency in 
English leads to income losses.  Also see Borjas (2000).        
5 Borjas (2000), for example, shows that foreign-born TAs (and their communication skills) are often less 
preferred to native TAs by US undergraduates.  It is well known that the US universities do make 
substantial use of a well-developed screening mechanism while offering admission and financial aid to 
such foreigners, including test of English language speaking abilities. 
6 Chau and Stark (1999) note that “whatever workers may take with them when they migrate, they cannot 
possibly transfer their home countries’ information structure.” (p.455).   
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we develop here.   
Clearly, the most important question at this point is whether the existence of 
asymmetric information in the labor market of the migrant-recipient country is sufficient 
to drive the results discussed above.  We establish, as we present the model, that 
asymmetric information across labor markets which leads to ‘statistical discrimination’ 
against the immigrants, should be treated as a crucial factor responsible for both high 
self-employment participation among immigrants and for their eventually higher income 
levels.   
Finally, it is useful to define self-employment in a way that shall be used through 
out the study.  In a statistical sense, individuals are “self-employed if they earn no wages 
or salary, but derive their incomes by exercising their profession or business on their own 
account and/or for their own risk” (De Wit, 1993, p. 2). 
Section 2 offers a simple model on the interaction between asymmetric 
information and choice of occupation with generalized and implicit solutions in favor of 
the degree of risk aversion for immigrants and natives with further implications for 
income convergence between the two groups.  Section 2.1 uses more specific functional 
forms to arrive at explicit solution of the levels of risk aversion between the two groups.  
Section 3 concludes.        
 
2. Asymmetric Information in the Labor Market  
Let the mass of immigrants moving from a poor country to a rich country be 
unity.  Assume that there are two groups of immigrants, skilled and unskilled. The 
number of skilled immigrants isα , and accordingly, the number of unskilled immigrants 
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is α−1 .7 The proportions of skilled and unskilled individuals in the native born 
population are the same.  The product of a skilled individual in the rich country is x; and 
the product of an unskilled individual is y, such that, x > y.  Each individual must decide 
whether to be employed or self-employed.  Employed individuals earn their product with 
certainty.8  Thus, an employed skilled immigrant should ideally earn x and an employed 
unskilled immigrant, y.  We assume that the skills possessed by a high-skill individual 
enable such individuals to be self-employed if they choose to.  In contrast, we assume 
that unskilled workers cannot be self-employed: all unskilled workers are employed. 
The income of a self-employed individual is uncertain: each such individual earns 
his product plus a random component plus a deterministic compensation for being 
exposed to risk.9 Thus, the income of a self-employed individual is  
δε ++= xz     (1) 
where ε is a random variable supported by (-a, a) with a density function )(εf , such 
that 0)( =εE ; and with mean zero, and 22 )( σε =E δ  is a positive constant.  In other 
words, )(εf follows uniform distribution.   
All individuals, immigrants and non-immigrants, have utility function with a 
constant absolute risk. The utility function is therefore of the form 
rweU −−=     (2) 
where w is the individual's total income, and r is the individual's absolute risk aversion, 
such that, .  Absolute risk aversion, r, varies among individuals according to a 01 ≥> r
                                                 
7 We assume that α is exogenously determined. 
8 Of course, the employed workers may also face wage uncertainty, but more often than not it is less than 
what the self-employed individuals are subject to.     
9 Given a population of risk-averse individuals, such compensation will always be a feature of the 
equilibrium. 
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density function g(r) supported by [0, 1).  We assume that all individuals are expected 
utility maximizers. 
Employers in the rich country can discern the skill levels of local individuals. 
However, they cannot discern skill levels of individual immigrants, and immigrants do 
not engage in any ‘signaling’ about their skill level.10  We finally assume that neither do 
the employers have an efficient screening device to ascertain immediately the true skill 
levels of the migrants originating from such diverse backgrounds.  Hence, the wage 
offered to any employed immigrant equals the average product of the entire employed 
immigrant cohort.11
Denote the proportion of skilled immigrants who are employed (as opposed to 
being self-employed), by *π . Sinceα  is the total number of skilled immigrants, this 
implies that the number of skilled immigrants who are employed is απ and the number of 
skilled immigrants who are self employed is απ*)1( − . Hence, the wage paid to the 
employed immigrants is 
ααπ
ααπ
−+
−+=
1*
)1(* yxw    (3) 
The higher the proportion of skilled immigrants employed in equilibrium, the higher is 
the average wage for all employed immigrants. 
Let r* be the level of risk aversion at which skilled individuals are indifferent between 
employment and self-employment.  Individuals with *rr ≥ choose employment, while 
                                                 
10See Katz and Stark (1987) for international migration patterns under asymmetric information with 
signaling.  However, signaling may be quite expensive for many immigrants originating in poor countries 
or for several other factors beyond the scope of discussion in this paper (for example, permanent refugee 
movements).  Besides, cross-border refugees, asylum-seekers and illegal migrants cannot signal their skill 
levels before physically migrating to a different country.    
11This is a linearity assumption, and fairly common in the related literature.  See for example, Chau and 
Stark (1999).   
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those with *rr <  choose self-employment.  Hence, the proportion of skilled immigrants 
who are employed is *)(1* rh−=π , where . Hence, substituting for *)(*)( 1 rGrh −≡ π  in 
(3) the average wage paid to immigrants is 
αα
αα
−+−
−+−=
1*))(1(
)1(*))(1(
rh
yxrhw   (4) 
If r* = 0, all skilled immigrants are employed, and the wage earned by immigrants is the 
maximum attainable given x, y andα .  And if r* = 1, all skilled immigrants are self-
employed, and unskilled workers receive their true product, y. The higher the degree of 
risk aversion of the marginal skilled employed immigrant, r*, the lower is the mean wage 
of employed immigrants.  In other words, a high value of r* implies that more skilled 
immigrants choose self- employment over employment, thereby depressing the 
equilibrium wage. 
The expected indirect utility of an employed immigrant (EI) with risk aversion 
is therefore given by (using 2) Ir
)(
1*))(1(
)1(*))(1( *
I
I
I rh
rh
yxrh
EI eV
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+−
−+−−−= αα
αα
     (5) 
and the expected indirect utility of a self-employed, skilled immigrant (SEI) is given by 
εεδε dfeV
a
a
xrh
SEI
I∫
−
++−−= )())(( *               (6) 
The ‘critical risk’ aversion is obtained by equating the indirect utilities from these two 
sources and applies to all individuals at the margin who are indifferent between the two 
choices.  All those who are distributed with a risk aversion higher than the critical level 
would be employed and those distributed below the critical level would be self-
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employed.  Hence, the critical degree of risk aversion is determined by equating VEI and 
VSEI.  The value of r* for immigrants, is implicit in *Ir
)
1*))(1(
)1(*))(1()(exp()( *))((
*
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+−
−+−−=∫
−
++−
αα
ααεεδε
I
I
I
a
a
xrh
rh
yxrhrhdfe I                    (7) 
For the skilled natives, the problem is somewhat different in the sense that their 
skill levels are known with certainty.  In other words, under symmetric information the 
employer does not face a problem with interpreting the true skill levels of the natives and 
offer them wages as per their true productivities.  However, the natives who would be 
self-employed in equilibrium must also face the same random return as in the case of 
immigrants.  Once again, unskilled natives are excluded from the choice of self-
employment.12  Thus, the critical r for non-immigrants is found by equating the expected 
utility of a self-employed skilled native worker (SEN) 
εεδε dfeV
a
a
xrh
SEN
N∫
−
++−−= )())(( *      (8) 
and the utility of an employed, skilled, non-immigrant, (EN) 
)( *Nrxh
EN eV
−−=                          (9) 
Thus, is implicit in *Nr
∫
−
−++− =
a
a
rxhxrh NN edfe )())((
**
)( εεδε    (10) 
                                                 
12 Choice of self-employment among unskilled may be introduced without any change in the direction of 
the results and is offered elsewhere in a related context.   
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Proposition 1:  The presence of asymmetric information in the labor market of the 
rich country results in a higher ‘critical’ risk aversion among the 
immigrants compared to the natives, i.e., .  ** NI rr >
 
Proof:   Unless r* = 0; 
x
rh
yxrh <−+−
−+−
αα
αα
1*))(1(
)1(*))(1(  
Now, in order to achieve certainty, a skilled immigrant must allow for a risk premium 
αα
ααδ −+−
−+−−+=
1*))(1(
)1(*))(1(
I
I
I rh
yxrhxP  
whereas, a skilled native worker bears a risk premium 
δ=NP  
Hence, 
NI PP >  
But, from the work of Arrow-Pratt it is well known that, everything else being equal, 
willingness to bear a higher risk premium implies greater risk aversion.  Hence, the 
critical value of  exceeds the critical value of , i.e., . Q Ir Nr ** NI rr >
Subsequently, let us compare the average incomes of the two groups – the 
immigrants and the natives, based on the results derived above.  Since, , the 
proportion of self-employed immigrants exceeds the proportion of self-employed 
native-born, .  The mean income of an immigrant is, therefore,    
**
NI rr >
)( *Irh
)( *Nrh
αα
ααααδαμ −+−
−+−−+−++=
1*))(1(
)1(*))(1()))(1(1())(( **1
I
I
II rh
yxrhrhxrh  
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yxrhxrh II )1(*))(1())((
* ααδα −+−++=  
yxrh I )1()(
* ααδα −++=  
whereas the mean income of a native born is 
yxrhxrh NNN )1())(1())((
** ααδαμ −+−++=  
yxrh N )1()(
* ααδα −++=  
so that,  
0))()(( ** >−=− NINI rhrhαδμμ  
Clearly, mean income of the immigrants exceeds the mean income of the native-born 
individuals. 
 Next, we argue that the income variance for both immigrants and natives has two 
components.  One of the components, cross-sectional variance is calculated from the 
income variance of those who are employed in equilibrium as compared to the mean 
income of the entire population.  The other component, temporal variance is the income 
variance due to self-employment earnings of immigrants and natives. 
Hence, the temporal variance of the income of an immigrant is 
2*222
1 )( σασ Irh=  
and the temporal variance of the income of a native born is 
2*222 )( σασ NN rh=  
so that, . 221 Nσσ >
In contrast, the relative size of cross sectional variance of the income of an immigrant and 
a native born is less unambiguous.  However, as we define it here, cross-sectional 
variance for immigrants is  
 13
2*2
1 ])][(1(1[ IIC wrh μαασ −−+−=  
whereas, for natives it is 
222 ])[1(][ NNCN yx μαμασ −−+−=  
such that, 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−
+−−++−<< )(1
)())(1())((
)(2
1,, *
2*22
*
*
22
1
I
N
I
I
CNC rh
rhyxxrh
rh
wiff α
δαααδαασσ  
          (11) 
Proposition 2: The average income of the immigrants exceeds that of the natives, 
as long as, , but with a certain higher temporal and a 
conditional lower cross-sectional variance of income, when the 
latter condition requires: 
**
NI rr >
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−
+−−++−< )(1
)())(1())((
)(2
1
*
2*22
*
*
I
N
I
I rh
rhyxxrh
rh
w α
δαααδαα   
 
The implications one may draw from these results are straightforward and likely to be 
valid for a wide range of cases involving immigrants and natives in a migrant-receiving 
country.  If the initial disadvantage pushes more skilled migrants into riskier self-
employment relative to their native counterparts, there arises a strong possibility of 
income convergence between the immigrants and natives.  However, this may not be 
possible unless the immigrants are exposed to a higher income volatility compared to 
natives.   These theoretical results, therefore, can be quite useful in generalizing the large 
number of empirical studies with regard to the income patterns and associated volatilities 
facing the immigrants.  The value addition of the paper is specifically in providing a 
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much-needed microeconomic interpretation of the route to faster income assimilation 
between immigrants and natives.              
 
2.1. An Example 
 Let us provide a specific example in this sub-section to establish that the results 
obtained above is tenable for a wide range of specifications under the standard von N-M 
type utility functions characterized by degrees of risk aversion.  In other words, this sub-
section begins by assuming that { xwNIjr otherwisej jrh ≠∀== ,1* *)(  , where, w is the total income 
earned by skilled natives and immigrants.  The implications are simple.  In the absence of 
asymmetric information, the workers are not exposed to risk on their choice of 
employment and would therefore receive their true product in the labor market.  
Conversely, if there exists some kind of uncertainty in the total income earned then the 
workers are exposed to certain degrees of critical risk aversion, *]*,[* rrrj −∈ .  This 
would require that we relax the previous limits on the values of .),( ** NI rr
13  The scaling 
up of the limit implies that *),( ** rrr NI ≤  set as the upper limit.  With these pre-requisites 
we can proceed to the explicit solutions of the two critical risk aversion levels.         
Retaining equations (1)-(3) we rewrite equation (4) as 
   αα
αα
−+−
−+−=
1*)1(
)1(*)1(
r
yxrw       (12) 
where, *1* r−=π , is the equilibrium employment of skilled workers.  Then substituting 
(12) in (5) and reformulating both (5) and (6) in terms of , one can find  explicitly )( *jrh
*
Ir
                                                 
13 It has been shown in several empirical and experimental exercises that the observed degrees of risk 
aversion usually varies between –1.5 to +1.6.   
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from equating the expected utility of self-employment to that from employment as in 
equation (13): 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+−
−+−−
−
++− =∫ αα
αα
δε εε 1)1(
)1()1(
)( *
*
*
*
)( I
I
I
I r
yxr
ra
a
xr edfe     
or,   
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+−
−+−−
−
++− =∫ αα
αα
δε ε 1)1(
)1()1(
)( *
*
*
*
2
1 I
I
I
I r
yxrra
a
xr ede
a    (13)  
It is seen from (13) that can have two proximate solutions: *Ir
(a) ; and (b) 1* =Ir αδ
δα −−−= ))(1(* yxrI , such that, .   (14) 1* >Ir
Now, while comparing the levels of risk aversions across natives and immigrants, the 
previous results would equally go through even if .  But for sake of generality, we 
would establish that for 
1* =Ir
αδ
δα −−−= ))(1(* yxrI , .  We need to obtain a 
solution for .  Equality of (8) and (9) from above along with the characterization 
of  imply that natives employed in equilibrium face .  Substituting this in 
(10), we get,     
0)( ** >− NI rr
*
Nr
)( *jrh 1)(
* =jrh
∫
−
−++− =
a
a
xxr ede
a
N εδε )(*
2
1
    (15) 
which solves for, 1* <+= δx
xrN , since, 0>δ .   
However, 1))(1(* >−−−= αδ
δα yxrI  0)( >+−⇒ δyx , which is always true given the 
initial assumptions.  It follows directly that, δαδ
δα
+=>>
−−−=
x
xryxr NI
** 1))(1( . 
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The rest of the results in section (2) automatically carry forward:     
 0 , and it can be directly argued that a higher critical risk 
aversion among immigrants leads to higher mean income vis-à-vis natives for similar 
skill composition across the labor force.  Thus, despite no a priori characterization of risk 
preference among natives and immigrants, it turns out that the presence of asymmetric 
information in the labor market of the migrant receiving country influences higher critical 
risk aversion among immigrants.  Higher critical risk aversion in turn is instrumental in 
raising the average income of immigrants above that earned by the natives, although with 
a higher temporal variance of income.  Indeed, for most v N-M type utility functions with 
similar arguments these results should hold, but intractability with algebraic solutions 
may require numerical support in some cases.        
)( ** >−=− NINI rrαδμμ
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 This short paper is an attempt to establish that asymmetric information in the 
labor market of a migrant-receiving country can significantly shape the occupational 
choice of migrants.   A number of explanations of why the immigrants tend to be over-
represented in the self-employment/entrepreneurship have emerged from several 
empirical studies on the occupational and income patterns of migrants.  These 
explanations broadly discuss factors such as, discrimination, ethnicity and cultural 
lineage of the immigrants when they arrive in the host country.  What we offered in this 
paper is a hitherto undocumented discussion of the role of asymmetric information in the 
host country labor market that is no less crucial in shaping the occupational and income 
patterns of immigrants and may even be a precursor to some of the other factors. 
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The idea of asymmetric information that leads to pooling of workers across the 
entire cohort of mixed skill types helps to show that the immigrant labor of the skilled 
variety owing to its initial disadvantage in the labor market may actually be excluded 
from the labor market.  In this matter, we have been careful not to use varying degrees of 
risk aversion across skill types, which some of the earlier papers do thereby pre-ordaining 
the skill types according to their preferences for risk aversion.  We used the uniform 
distribution of risk aversion across all skill types and no a priori distinction of the same 
regarding risk preference as an effective instrument of control.  We show that the 
incapability of employers to identify the skilled from the unskilled operates as the main 
factor in this analysis.  It pushes the more skilled workers to that part on the distribution 
of risk aversion across the cohort where return from self-employment exceeds that from 
employment.  It also implies that a larger number of skilled immigrants are distributed in 
the region where individual risk aversion level exceeds the critical level, compared to 
natives.  The occupational distribution thus obtained in turn establishes that the same 
condition that ensures higher critical risk aversion among immigrants vis-à-vis natives is 
also responsible for higher average income for the former.  Clearly, this is not an end in 
itself.  Although we do not derive the conditions for income convergence explicitly, the 
above result implies that ceteris paribus, if the average income of immigrants exceeds 
that of the natives in a particular year, the two income levels would converge over time 
with the possibility that the immigrants overtake the income level of the natives after 
some years of residence in the foreign country.  This validates our initial claim that the 
role of asymmetric information is quite crucial in shaping occupational choice among the 
immigrants and that it may culminate into income convergence with the group (natives) 
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that surely has a more advantageous position, information-wise, at the time when the 
immigrant first arrives.            
The analysis leaves out in favor of future attention, a number of factors that may 
have potential side roles in driving these results, such as, access to credit, the role of 
asymmetric information across other factor markets, training undertaken by migrants in 
the foreign country, language ability, etc.  These ideas have earlier come up for 
discussion in the empirical papers, although without drawing any explicit relationship 
with the issue of asymmetric information in the labor market.   
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